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Summary
Management of government debt in Hungary is a particularly important task, as the 
country has a relatively high level of debt above 70 per cent of GDP, despite its declin-
ing trend in recent years. The same indicator is lower in the other Visegrád coun-
tries, in Czechia, Poland and Slovakia, it is between 32 and 49 per cent. Since 2010, 
the Hungarian Government Debt Management Agency has also placed considerable 
emphasis on making public debt financing more secure and has achieved significant 
results. In terms of managing public debt, three types of risk factors are distinguished 
and are called ‘original sins’ in the economic literature. The first one is indebtedness 
in foreign currency, the second one is short-term indebtedness, and the third one is 
indebtedness to foreigner investors. This study examines the effects of these three 
risk factors from a theoretical point of view. The evaluation of these risk aspects be-
tween 2010 and 2018 in Hungary is also presented in comparison to Czechia, Poland 
and Slovakia. The results obtained suggest that at present Hungary and Slovakia are 
in a better position than directly after the crisis in two parameters, and Czechia has 
improved in one, while Poland has increased its risk exposure in all the three criteria.
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Introduction
Professional discourse on public debt is mostly about its size relative to GDP, and this 
is the only debt indicator even in the Maastricht criteria of euro adoption. However, 
the indebtedness of a country and the stability of its debt are defined by many other 
factors as well: the composition of the debt (foreign currency or domestic currency), 
its maturity structure, and the actors (domestic or foreign, household or financial 
institutions) holding it. A combination of all these influence public debt and the gov-
ernment’s room for easing in a turbulent period. In this paper the evolution of the 
current structure of Hungarian government debt is tracked down from the 2007–2008 
crisis and compared to the other Visegrád countries (Czechia, Poland and Slovakia).
After a presentation of the evolution of public debt in the surveyed countries, 
developments in the main structural indicators between 2010 and 2018 are described 
on the basis of the “original sin” concept, coined and elaborated by Eichengreen and 
Hausmann (1999) and Eichengreen et al. (2002). This is to assess the extent the coun-
tries of the Visegrád Group are prepared for a possible future crisis and the adverse 
effects of a low level of preparedness on debt. 
Developments in government debt and interests
The high level of government debt has an effect on the country’s growth prospects. 
Reinhart et al. (2012) illustrated that very high government debt, above 90 per cent 
of GDP, slows economic growth: they measured an average 1.2 per cent point slower 
growth rate in periods with high indebtedness compared with periods when the debt 
level was below this rate. Thus, it is worth examining how indebtedness developed 
in the Central European region. Government debt to GDP changed differently in 
the various countries of region between 2010 and 2018: in Czechia, it decreased by 
4.7 percentage points to 32.7 per cent, in Poland by 4.2 percentage points to 48.9 per 
cent and in Hungary by 9.4 percentage points to 70.8 per cent. In contrast, in Slova-
kia, public debt increased from 41.2 to 48.9 per cent per of GDP in the reviewed pe-
riod. The reason behind Slovakia’s growing debt is a looser fiscal stance. The primary 
deficit (deficit indicator excluding interest income and expense) of the Slovakian 
budget was on average 1.5 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2018, while the pri-
mary deficit in Poland was 1.3 per cent and in Czechia 0.2 per cent. In contrast, the 
Hungarian budget, excluding interest payment, had a 0.9 per cent surplus on average 
between 2010 and 2018, which significantly contributed to a substantial reduction in 
public debt despite the higher interest burden resulting from higher indebtedness. It 
was achieved by a fiscal policy discipline and the fact that reduction in the public debt 
to GDP ratio was made a government priority. It is called “fiscal turn”, while in the 8 
years before 2010 opposite developments took place: as a result of high budget deficit, 
the debt ratio rose from 55.3 to 80.2 per cent of GDP in this period.
It is worth noting that before the 2008 crisis, not only the state suffered from exces-
sive indebtedness in Hungary but also companies and households. Similarly to public 
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debt, in addition to the volume of borrowing, the structure of the debt portfolio, i.e. 
the share of foreign currency loans in household lending was significant, as their re-
payment caused problems after the crisis. As a result of the unfavourable experience 
in lending, which was restarted to enterprises under various programmes (different 
phases of the Growth Credit Programme) led by the National Bank of Hungary.
The level of public debt is regulated by the Maastricht criteria, which include the 
requirements of joining the euro area, also as a general rule applicable to the mem-
bers of the euro area. IN theory, an EU Member State wishing to join should not 
have debt exceding 60 per cent of GDP, but in practice, the European Central Bank 
also accepts continuously decreasing debt. Hungary applies a stricter fiscal rule, also 
included in the Fundamental Law: as long as the public debt exceeds 50 per cent of 
GDP, Parliament can only adopt a budget that reduces the government debt relative 
to GDP. In addition, according to the Stability Act, if both the inflation and real GDP 
growth exceed 3 per cent, rise of the nominal public debt cannot exceed the differ-
ence of the inflation rate and half of the real GDP growth rate recorded in the previ-
ous year. The Hungarian regulation is special because it applies not only to planning 
and approvale but also to implementation (Kovács, 2016). 
Chart 1: Government debt to GDP (%)
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In addition to the government debt to GDP, it is also important to examine a coun-
try’s spending on interest each year, as it demonstrates the actual cost of public debt. 
According to the Eurostat data, in Czechia, the interest paid by the budget fell from 
1.3 to 0.8 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2018. Over the same period, interest 
expenditures fell from 2.5 to 1.4 per cent of GDP in Poland and from 4.1 to 2.5 per 
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cent in Hungary. In Slovakia, despite increase in public debt, the interest rate to GDP 
remained unchanged. Reduction in interest is extremely important for governments, 
as it allows use of the available resources for economy development, increases com-
petitiveness and improves welfare through social benefits.
Chart 2: Interest payment to GDP (%)
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Decline in interest in Czechia, Poland and Hungary can also be explained by the 
low-interest-rate environment, which also explains why the Slovakian interest expend-
iture did not rise in parallel with the rise in public debt. 
In 2010 secondary market yields were the highest in Hungary: on a 1-year ma-
turity yield was 6.5 per cent, while over a 3-year maturity it was around 8 per cent. 
However, by the end of 2018, yields had declined significantly: on a 1-year maturity, 
the government was only able to issue bonds at a rate of 0.45 per cent, and 10-year 
yields had also decreased by more than 5 percentage points during the examined 
8-year period. The data are somewhat misleading because due to changes in the 
international environment, yields had already risen in 2018. Yields were influenced 
partly by monetary policy between 2010 and 2018. At the end of 2010, the central 
bank base rate stood at 5.75 per cent, which had dropped to 0.9 per cent by the end 
of May 2016. However, the National Bank of Hungary influenced yields not only by 
changing the base rate but also by launching various programmes to reduce them 
(Lentner, 2018). In addition, the favourable international environment and the im-
proving perception of Hungary also contributed to decline in interest rates. This is 
clearly visible in the change of 5-year CDS spreads, which is a country-risk indicator: 
its value was 386.75 basis points in Hungary at the end of 2010, the highest value in 
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the reviewed four countries, but it had decreased to 88.14 basis points by the end 
of 2018.
Similar developments have occurred in the case of the other countries in the re-
gion. In Poland, the short, 1-year yields fell from 4 per cent to 0.9 per cent, while the 
long-term 10-year yields fell from 6.1 to 2.8 per cent. Similarly to Hungary, monetary 
policy also had a significant impact on the yield curve in Poland. At the end of 2010, 
the base rate of the National Bank of Poland stood at 3.5 per cent, while in 2018 it 
was only 1.5 per cent. In addition, perception of the Polish economy had improved 
significantly: the value of the 5-year CDS spread fell from 146 basis points to 67.55 
basis points in the period reviewed. However, the 2018 developments had a different 
impact on the Polish indicators than on Hungarians: yields could decrease further but 
the CDS spread slightly increased by nearly 12 basis points.
Chart 3: Yield on the last day of the year (%)
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Yields decreased the least in Czechia during the period under review, as a result of 
several factors. On the one hand, the Czech yields were the lowest in the region at the 
end of 2010: 1.4 per cent on one-year maturity and slightly below 4.0 per cent on the 
ten-year maturity in the secondary market. Thus, there was only a very slight room for 
the decrease in bond yields up to the end of 2018: it declined to 1.9 per cent on the 
ten-year maturity, 1.7 per cent on the five-year maturity and it has not changed on the 
one-year maturity. Another factor that contributed to this was that the Czech National 
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Bank’s base rate was already at a low 0.75 per cent in 2010. The European Central 
Bank started a tightening policy in 2018: it increased its 0.05 per cent base rate in two 
steps to 0.5 per cent in the second half of 2017, and then to 1.75 per cent in 2018. It 
also had an impact on bond yields because there were negative yields on the five-year 
maturity in the secondary market in the case of Czech government bonds at the end 
of 2016. Similarly to Hungary and Poland, the Czech five-year country risk premium 
also fell during the analysed seven-year period, although slightly: from 91 to 40.86 
basis points, the lowest among the Visegrád countries.
While in Slovakia yields were still between 1.8 and 3.8 per cent on the one-year 
and five-year maturities at the end of 2010, on the three-year maturity they went into 
the negative at the end of 2018, but at the maturity of five years, yields were also at a 
minimum 0.15 per cent. The ECB’s monetary policy, which had a direct impact on 
Slovakian yields and an indirect one on the other yields in the region, played a key 
role in creating negative yields in Slovakia. The ECB’s base rate was still 1.0 per cent 
at the end of 2010, which then gradually decreased to 0 per cent. Besides, the ECB’s 
bond purchase programme had a significant impact on bond yields. From July 2009 
the ECB implemented asset purchase programmes, but the Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP), the most significant one of all, only started in March 2015. In 
the PSPP the ECB buys government bonds issued by the Member States of the euro 
area, as well as bonds issued by acknowledged agencies, regional and local govern-
ments, international organisations and multilateral development banks. Within this 
framework, the central bank bought bonds for more than net EUR 2170 billion at the 
end of 2018, of which nearly 90 per cent were government bonds issued by Member 
States. This had a significant impact on yields at the long end of the yield curve. In 
the case of Slovakia, the European Central Bank had bought Slovakian state bonds for 
nearly net EUR 11.7 billion in the framework of its asset purchase programme by the 
end of 2018, which represented 26.5 per cent of the country’s public debt in 2018. As 
the other three Visegrád countries are not members of the euro area, they were only 
be indirectly affected by the asset purchase programme through the rearrangement 
of investor portfolios. However, the Slovakian 5-year CDS spread was still the lowest 
among the Visegrád countries (83 basis points) partly also because of the euro area 
membership, and then it decreased to 48.58 basis points. Consequently, besides the 
favourable yield environment, improvement in Slovakia’s perception has also contrib-
uted to decline in yields.
Consequently, the Visegrád countries could benefit only slightly from the favour-
able market developments (loose monetary policy and significant improvement in the 
international perception of the region) to reduce their public debt, and moreover 
Slovakia was characterised by increasing public debt relative to GDP, despite the un-
conventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank. In spite of this, coun-
tries in the region are in a favourable situation because the debt ratios of Czechia, 
Poland and Slovakia are considerably below the Maastricht threshold of 60 per cent 
and the Hungarian indicator is also 9.2 percentage points lower than the EU average.
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The role of foreign currency debt
The literature on debt management contains the concept of the “original sin”, which 
was adopted by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), and by Eichengreen et al. (2002). 
In these papers, the authors considered three cases as original sins.
The first type of original sin is a case when a country is unable to issue bonds in 
its own currency abroad, and so the country is compelled to issue them in foreign 
currency. Depending on the share of foreign currency funds, this may cause several 
adverse effects on the country:
– An open foreign currency position is generated in the country’s balance sheet, 
raising the debt level denominated in domestic currency in the case of severe ex-
change rate fluctuations or significant depreciations of the domestic currency ex-
change rate;
– The central bank must pay particular attention to avoid unfavourable exchange 
rate movements when setting the base rate, and this reduces the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy;
– The central bank is forced to maintain significantly higher foreign exchange 
reserves, and this also means higher costs;
– Foreign exchange debt, therefore, limits the central bank in preventing liquidity 
crises and fulfilling its lender-of-last-resort role;
– High FX debt increases the risk premium and downgrades credit rating;
– The volatility of capital flows increases in the country.
Olivier (2002) confirms Eichengreen’s and Hausmann’s (1999) assertion and 
highlights that certain less developed countries are unable to finance their public 
debt by issuing domestic currency denominated bonds abroad or on a long matu-
rity. Instead, less developed countries finance their public debt in foreign currency, 
through the issue of government bonds abroad. As a result, they are more vulnerable 
to financial turbulences. The author undoubtedly blames the lack of credibility of 
the monetary policy for rising foreign exchange indebtedness. The more credible 
a monetary policy, the higher the chance to issue long-term government bonds in 
domestic currency.
Claessens et al. (2007) examined a new aspect of foreign currency indebtedness 
and used panel data to show that not only the size of the economy but also the ex-
tent of the domestic financial system (measured as loans for the private sector and 
stock market capitalization) also plays a role in the development of bond markets with 
higher domestic currencies. If such a market emerges, the state is less compelled to 
issue bonds in foreign currency.
In spite of the above, the argument for indebtedness in foreign currency is mainly 
that government securities become available to a broader investor base, and this re-
sults in lower yields than in indebtedness in domestic currency. In addition, the gov-
ernment and the central bank have access to foreign exchange and there may also be 
political benefits for their presence in certain foreign markets.
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Chart 4: Composition of the Maastricht debt by currency
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The share of the Maastricht debt denominated in foreign currency varied differ-
ently in the Visegrád Group. In Czechia, it decreased slightly, from 18.2 to 13.5 per 
cent, and in Hungary significantly, from 47.6 to 22.8 per cent. In contrast, the ratio of 
public debt denominated in foreign currency increased from 27.3 to 31.0 per cent. 
The role of foreign currency in public debt was the lowest in Slovakia in 2010 and in 
2018 as well. However, Slovakia’s situation is partly different from the other Visegrád 
countries: as a member of the euro area, the Slovakian central bank does not have 
the same level of influence on its own currency as the monetary policy-makers of the 
other three countries, and therefore it has less room to change the size of the debt.
However, it is important to highlight that the above chart about the FX debt by cur-
rency is somewhat deceptive because of the European Central Bank’s methodology. 
For example, in Hungary, only 42.3 per cent of foreign currency debt was denominat-
ed in euro at the end of 2018, based on data from the Government Debt Management 
Agency. However, the debt manager performs swap operations to convert the total 
cash flow (capital and interest liabilities) of the issued debt denominated into euro, 
and thus the debt only runs the forint-to-euro exchange rate risk.1 In addition to the 
euro, the Hungarian state also issued government securities in dollar, Japanese yen 
and Chinese yuan, the latter two on the local markets (Samurai and Panda bonds). 
The 2017 Panda bond issue was extremely important for Hungary: as a result, the 
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Hungarian State became the first foreign issuer to have yuan bonds issued both in the 
internal (Panda) and in the external (Hong Kong) market, and the transaction was 
part of the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative of the Government of China. The Polish 
public debt manager executes swap operations similarly to Hungary, although not for 
its total foreign currency debt. In 2017, 78.3 per cent of the Polish foreign currency 
debt, including swap operations, was denominated in euros, 12.9 per cent in dollars, 
5.5 per cent in Swiss francs and 3.3 per cent in Japanese yen. The Czech public debt 
manager only ran the euro-to-koruna risk.
As a conclusion it can be established that while public debt exposure to the first 
original sin has significantly decreased in Hungary, has reduced slightly in Czechia, 
and has increased in Poland. Slovakia is not exposed to the first original sin in the clas-
sical sense of the term, due to its membership in the euro area. But it is important to 
note that exposure of the debt to foreign currency is a high risk in terms of finances, 
and it is not an optimum strategy for debt management bodies to fully terminate 
this kind of debt, as it has its advantages, and with swap transactions the risk can be 
reduced significantly.
Maturity of the government debt
According to Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Eichengreen et al. (2002), the 
second type of original sin is to be indebted in the short-term. The problem arises 
when a country is unable to finance its long-term debt with fixed interest rates, so the 
risk of renewing funding can be high. Thus an increase in the remaining maturity of 
a debt is welcome because it reduces the vulnerability of the debt issued in domestic 
currency.
Stein (2012) specifically emphasizes that in the case of significant or predomi-
nantly short-term financing, individual actors (bank intermediaries) underestimate 
the social costs of fire sale generated by individual market players. Banks can decide 
to increase their capital or sell their financial assets in order to improve their solvency. 
Both lead to a prudent operation on a micro-economic level, but if banks choose the 
latter massively, the prices of financial instruments may fall drastically, which leads 
to systemic risks. A similar situation evolves when certain countries are primarily in-
debted in the short term and underestimate the importance of liquidity constraints 
and interest rates/yields increase when government bonds are renewed.
In contrast, Greenwood et al. (2015) point out that governments can also pursue 
macro-prudential policies through the management of public debt. If the state is in-
debted in the short term, it displaces the private sector’s short-term liabilities and 
directs them towards longer maturities. According to the authors, the government 
should be indebted in the short term as long as the social costs of short-term indebted-
ness fall short of the private sector’s money generation costs. In other words, the state 
should be indebted in the short term until it has a comparative advantage over the 
private sector in issuing risk-free financial instruments. Among the costs of short-term 
indebtedness, the authors highlight the fluctuation of taxes. Angeletos (2002) points 
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out that a change in the tax system, in any case, reduces social welfare, and thus the 
government must always strive to ensure a stable tax system. This is only possible if the 
change in the debt perfectly compensates the changes in budget expenditure and in 
the tax base (given that the present value of taxes is equal to the sum of the present 
value of expenditures and debt service). In the case of short-term indebtedness, the 
government has to react to the fluctuations in the budget balance by raising taxes 
(and increasing debt in order to smooth taxation), but if it is indebted in the long 
term, the market value of bonds decreases during a crisis, resulting in profits for the 
state, thus compensating the rising expenditures and declining tax revenues.
Broner et al. (2013) analyse the reasons for the fact that emerging countries 
(EMEs) primarily issue short-term bonds as opposed to long-term financing. They 
find that this is mainly due to the fact that short-term financing is cheaper than long-
term financing. During a crisis, the interest rate/yield difference between short- and 
long-term bonds (term premium) increases. This shifts the government securities 
portfolio even further towards short-term financing and shorter average maturity. In 
addition, Missale and Blanchard (1991) argue that in economies with high public 
debt the government is forced to reduce the maturity in order to maintain its credibil-
ity and ensure investors that it is not its goal to vanish public debt through increased 
inflation.
However, it is important to draw attention to the duality of maturity too. The long 
maturity is favourable during a crisis because rising interest rates appear only delayed 
in yields. Thus, the interest on the budget will only increase delayed, which means 
that budget resources can be used to alleviate the symptoms of the crisis. In contrast, 
if the economy has a long maturity at the start of a prosperity cycle then the resources 
are needed for paying the yields of government securities issued earlier in a crisis 
period (in a higher interest environment), and for repurchasing them before they 
expire. The optimum strategy is to increase the average maturity of the public debt as 
much as possible during the prosperity, and when the economy slows down and, if the 
market environment allows, issuing only in the shorter term.
Several indicators are available in the literature to measure maturity. Three are 
worth highlighting: the average time to maturity (ATM), the average time to re-fixing 
(ATR), and the duration. All the three indicators measure the maturity of public debt 
but taking into account different types of risk (Mohai, 2018). The average time to 
maturity is the weighted average of the remaining maturity in the government debt 
portfolio, thus showing the risk of renewing public debt. In contrast, the ATR takes 
into account that floating rate instruments may be repriced several times during ma-
turity. Therefore, the indicator shows, in the case of fixed rate government bonds, 
the average of the remaining maturity, and the average remaining maturity until the 
next interest rate re-fixing for floating rate securities. Thus, the ATR primarily shows 
the interest rate risk of public debt, i.e. the time horizon of a potential rise in interest 
rate within the portfolio. Duration differs between the ATR and the ATM in several 
repects: it is based on market value instead of the face value and takes into account 
the payable interest due to maturity. However, due to the latter, it responds primarily 
177
Civic Review · Vol. 15, Special Issue, 2019
to changes in the market environment, which does not fundamentally affect public 
debt management and is therefore mainly used by investors. Nevertheless, several 
government debt managers use this indicator for setting benchmarks. Up to 2019 
the Hungarian government debt manager used duration as a benchmark, but from 
this year it has switched to the use of the ATR, and the Polish and Czech government 
debt managers also include both the ATR and the ATM in their objectives. On the 
other hand, the Slovakian debt manager sets a target for the ratio of bonds maturing 
within 1 and 5 years for the refinancing risk. Similarly, in the case of repricing risk, 
they primarily look is at the proportion of bonds repriced within 1 and 5 years, while 
the duration is the secondary indicator.
Chart 5: Developments in the average time to maturity, ATM (year)
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The average remaining maturity decreased in three of the four countries: in the 
greatest extent in Czechia, by 0.9 years to 5.4 years, as against the target set by the 
public debt manager in the financing plan, being 6 years in 2018. The value of the 
ATM decreased in Hungary to a lesser extent by 0.6 years to 3.5 years. In Poland, data 
also show a decreasing trend, but it is important to note that in contrast to Czechia, in 
Poland the value of the ATM is still above the benchmark set by the government debt 
manager (minimum 4 years for domestic and 5 years for foreign public debt). Not-
withstanding the above, the three countries were more exposed to the risk of renewal 
in 2018 than in 2010. By contrast, the average remaining maturity of the government 
debt portfolio rose significantly from 5.5 years to 8.8 years in Slovakia.
178
Dániel Molnár and Gábor Regős: The Change of Government Debt Management...
Chart 6: Developments in the average time to re-fixing, ATR (year)
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A similar picture emerges for the ATR: the Czech indicator declined from 5.0 to 
4.7 years, exceeding the 4-year target set by the government debt manager. The value 
of the Hungarian indicator decreased from 3.3 to 3.2 years, while the Polish indica-
tor fell from 4.5 to 3.8 years.2 In other words, the interest rate sensitivity of public 
debt portfolios increased slightly during 8 years under review in the three countries. 
However, the Slovakian government debt manager does not provide data on the 
ATR. This is mainly due to the fact that the government debt it manages is fully fixed, 
i.e. the repricing of floating rate bonds in Slovakia is not a risk when interest rates 
increasing.
It is worth noting the role of variable interest rates in other countries as it shows 
the difference between the ATM and the ATR. Only the European Central Bank’s data 
series are available about this difference, but they fail to show the public debt man-
aged by government debt managers, with the exception of the Maastricht public debt. 
Besides, in the database, the breakdown into fixed and variable interest rates applies 
only to government debts with a maturity of over one year.
The role of floating rate government securities is marginal in the region. Be-
tween 2010 and 2018, there was a slight decrease in Slovakia, while in Czechia the 
role of floating interest stagnated within the Maastricht public debt: in both econo-
mies, around 10 per cent of the government debt with maturity of over 1 year had 
floating interest rates. In contrast, in Hungary and Poland, the role of floating rate 
government securities increased significantly, by more than 10 percentage points, 
and as of 2018 more than one-fifth of long-term Polish debt had floating interest 
rates.
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Chart 7: Long-term government debt (over 1 year) by interest type
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Government debt by holder
For public debt management the ownership structure, i.e. whether the issued public 
debt is held by domestic or foreign actors, is also important. This is related to the third 
type of original sin, when a significant part of debt denominated in domestic currency 
is held by foreigners. In the domestic currency portfolio of foreigners the activity may 
be quite volatile, which can significantly outperform the behaviour changes of domes-
tic market participants. This may affect the country in particular during a crisis. Yields 
can suddenly rise and sales by foreigners on the domestic secondary market can cause 
significant financing difficulties. In contrast, if a significant portion of government 
debt is held by residents then the interest paid by the state remains within the country 
and no capital outflow occurs as a result of interest payments.
In addition, Panizza (2008) emphasizes that companies in emerging countries of-
ten do not have access to the international capital market, and so the state acts as an 
intermediary either by providing guarantees or by issuing the amount needed. In 
addition, widening the domestic investor base may reduce risks, so the efforts made 
by decision-makers to this end should be supported but they should make significant 
compromises. Most of the emerging countries are unable to be indebted in the in-
ternal market over long maturities at an acceptable interest rate. The Polish data give 
a good illustration: at the end of 2017, the average remaining maturity of domestic 
Polish debt was 4.49 years, while that of foreign debt was 6.46 years.
180
Dániel Molnár and Gábor Regős: The Change of Government Debt Management...
According to Panizza (2008), the presence of capital control may play a role in the 
success of internal indebtedness but the literature has various results in this regard. In 
addition, the author highlights the size of the internal market in terms of the success 
of internal indebtedness, but a wider circle of investors may cause problems if they 
are not well informed. Attracting foreign investors to the domestic market may have 
unfavourable effects on the volatility of capital flows and can lead to financial instabil-
ity. Panizza emphasizes that despite the fact that indebtedness in the domestic market 
is more expensive, governments should use this form as the creation of the internal 
market can generate significant positive externalities.
A well-functioning domestic government security market can also contribute to 
the development of domestic financial markets, by increasing savings and invest-
ments. As government bonds are marketable instruments, they are suitable for trad-
ing in interbank markets, which improves banks’ liquidity and thus reduces the need 
for monetary policy intervention. Besides, interest rates on government securities can 
also serve as benchmarks for financial actors to issue bonds that help the corporate 
bond market development. In addition, government bonds offer investors an alterna-
tive against foreign investment which can reduce capital flows and result in a return 
on savings, deepening the financial system (Abbas and Christensen, 2010).
Additional risks for domestic indebtedness in the domestic market include the 
crowding out effect. By issuing government securities domestically, governments ab-
sorb some of the savings that could be also used by the private sector, thereby re-
ducing investment and slowing economic growth. However, this is only a problem in 
countries without an extensive financial system and with private sector players having 
no access to international capital markets. Besides high and safe yields, the banking 
sector is less motivated to finance risky projects, which can reduce investment activity.
Chart 8: Government debt held by residents (% of debt)
Source: European Central Bank 
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According to the data of the European Central Bank, the ratio of foreigners was 
the highest in the Hungarian Maastricht debt among the Visegrád countries in 2010: 
the Hungarian state paid interest rates to abroad after more than half of its debt. By 
2018, this had radically changed: domestic residents hold the majority of the public 
debt, and thus, they have the most important role in financing public debt. The other 
Visegrád countries have experienced opposite developments: the ratio of public debt 
held by domestic residents has decreased. As a result, in 2018 foreign ownership is 
in majority in Poland and Slovakia and the share of domestic investors have fallen by 
8.9 percentage points in the Czech Republic too, but the 60.4 per cent ratio of Czechs 
is still considered high in the region.
In addition to the ratio of domestic to foreign ownership, the composition of in-
vestors (fund managers, banks, the central bank, households) holding government 
securities in the given country is also important. In Hungary, one of the key factors in 
the transformation of public debt management in recent years has been the encour-
agement of households’ participation. There are two arguments for increasing this 
participation. Firstly, people are less sensitive to changes in the market environment, 
so it is unlikely that in a turbulent period they will decide to get rid of the govern-
ment securities, which means a stable investor group for the government. Secondly, 
the budget pays interest to the population after government bonds, some of which is 
returned to the budget through consumption, in the form of taxes. The disadvantage 
is primarily higher cost: a sales network needs to be maintained by the public debt 
manager and the public should be familiarised with the bonds. In addition, the inter-
est rates must be higher than those offered for institutional investors in order to make 
the individual schemes attractive.
The chart below shows changes in the role of the households in financing public 
debt. According to the European Central Bank’s data, the share of the non-financial 
sector in government debt is marginal in Czechia, Poland and Slovakia. Slovakia does 
not offer government bond schemes to households, and although such government 
securities used to available in Czechia, they were withdrawn at the end of 2014. On the 
basis of the financing plans at that time, the Czech public debt manager continued to 
take into account household investors, however, in order to reduce the cost of sales 
they wanted to solve the sale directly by avoiding financial intermediaries. Since 2016 
the public debt manager has no longer been counting on this segment due to declin-
ing public debt and interests.
In Poland households, foundations and social organizations can buy various 
government securities with maturity between 3 months and 10 years, at a nominal 
value of 100 zloty, through the PKO Bank Polski network. The role of the sector in 
the total debt remains low, although slightly increased since 2010. By contrast, in 
Hungary, the role of the non-financial sector increased significantly between 2010 
and 2018. In 2010, the share of the sector was close to that of other Visegrád coun-
tries. However, by 2018 more than one-fifth of the total debt had been concentrated 
in the hands of non-financial players. In Hungary, growth in government securi-
ties held by households can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, various types of 
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Chart 9: Government debt held by the non-financial sector (% of debt)
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schemes (maturity, interest rate) are available for household investors, so it can 
be an attractive investment opportunity for individuals with diverse savings prefer-
ences. Secondly, the yields of the bonds are significantly higher than those of bank 
deposits, so they are very attractive for those who want to save, and are also widely 
known through the notable marketing activities of the Government Debt Manage-
ment Agency.
According to the calculations of Kicsák (2016), the change in the Hungarian own-
ership structure, i.e. the growth relative to household government securities was not 
accompanied by an increase in budget expenditures, as higher interest rates were 
offset by rising tax revenues and lower market yields due to lower supply. Besides, the 
portfolio reorganization has reduced Hungary’s external debt and thus its vulner-
ability.
In summary, among the countries of the region in Czechia, Poland and Slovakia, 
exposure to the third original sin increased between 2010 and 2018. In the case of 
the latter two, foreign owners had the majority of government debt. In contrast, 
domestic financing has become a core strategy in Hungary: with the involvement 
of household investors, government decision-makers have succeeded in getting for-
eign funding into the minority in public debt. However, the government is planning 
further advances: in the next 5 years in order to fully replace foreign financing, ef-
forts are made at doubling the stock of household government securities (Kuti and 
Koroknai, 2019).
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Summary
In recent years significant changes have taken place in sovereign debt in the countries 
of the Visegrád Group. Due to the low-interest environment and to the more favour-
able international perception of the region, interest on public debt has significantly 
decreased in the V4. However, in Czechia and Poland, the government debt rela-
tive to GDP decreased only marginally, while in Slovakia it rose even further between 
2010 and 2018. Hungary’s public debt declined most (almost 10 percentage points) 
between 2010 and 2018, but it still remains the highest among the four countries. In 
Hungary, the reduction of the government debt to GDP ratio was primarily driven by 
the disciplined fiscal policy of the government, which was also supported by the low-
interest-rate environment created by the National Bank of Hungary. The latter was 
made possible by the money surplus in the international financial markets. However, 
preparedness for a potential crisis is only partially reflected in GDP-proportionate 
public debt, it is also influenced by other factors of public debt. In recent years, Hun-
gary has also taken steps to financing public debt in a more secure way.
This paper has shown changes in the structure of public debt in the Visegrád coun-
tries in respect of the original sins defined by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and 
Eichengreen et al. (2002). The role of foreign currency debt, i.e. the first original sin, 
has declined significantly in Hungary and slightly in Czechia, so these two countries 
are in a better position than in 2010. In Poland, on the other hand, the role of foreign 
currency debt has slightly increased along with the exposure to the exchange rate 
risk, while in Slovakia nearly the total national debt is denominated in the domestic 
currency, namely the euro.
The literature considers indebtedness in the short term as the second type of origi-
nal sin. There were unfavourable developments in the two analysed indicators, the 
average time to maturity and the average time to re-fixing. In Czechia, Hungary and 
Poland, the maturity of public debt have decreased, while in Slovakia it has increased 
significantly. In other words, the Visegrád countries were more exposed at the end of 
2018 to the risk of renewal and interest rate than in 2010.
The third original sin is indebtedness to foreign investors. In this respect, only 
Hungary managed to secure a more favourable position during the reviewed 8 years, 
primarily due to the encouragement of household participation. In Slovakia and Po-
land, however, opposite developments have taken place: majority domestic ownership 
recorded back in 2010 has been replaced by foreign majority, and the role of non-
residents has also increased significantly in Czechia.
In summary, the Visegrád countries have achieved mixed performance with regard 
to the three original sins: Hungary and Slovakia are in a better position than directly 
after the crisis in two respects and Czechia in one respect, while Poland has deterio-
rated in all three. However, the extent to which the countries in the region will be 
affected by the expected next crisis and the extent to which public debt is crisis-proof, 
remain a matter of concern.
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Notes
1  The European Central Bank shows the composition of government debt taking into account FX swap 
operations.
2  The Polish public debt manager only sets an ATR benchmark (2.8–3.8 years) for domestic public debt, 
which was achieved in June 2018 (3.24 years).
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